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Riassunto
Nel mio lavoro si esamina se il tema della giurisdizione universale conduca all’unità o alla frammentazione del diritto
penale internazionale.
Dopo alcuni cenni sulla letteratura in materia, verranno valutati gli elementi a favore e quelli contro l’implementazione
del principio di giurisdizione universale. Successivamente, il principio della giurisdizione universale, inteso da taluni
come controversa forma di giurisdizione, verrà esaminato relativamente a quei Paesi che hanno diversamente legiferato
in materia, per focalizzare l’attenzione sulla sua efficacia e legittimità.
Nella prima sezione sarà fornita una panoramica degli Stati che, in ossequio alla ratificazione dello Statuto di Roma,
hanno risolto il problema dell’universalità della giurisdizione in materia penale secondo forme e modalità differenti.
Nella  seconda  sezione,  attraverso  una  panoramica  dei  casi  giurisprudenziali,  verrà  tracciata  una  possibile  linea  di
unificazione della tematica a partire dal rispetto del principio di legalità, anche da un punto di vista internazionalistico, e
facendo riferimento alla identificazione formale e sostanziale delle fattispecie per cui potrebbe applicarsi il principio. Il
legame più forte di unità è dato sicuramente dalla definizione dei crimini internazionali presenti nelle varie convenzioni
e nello Statuto di Roma.
La  conclusione  richiama  una  personale  interpretazione  della  giurisdizione  universale  in  chiave  di  globalizzazione
sociologica.
Résumé
Dans cet article, la question que nous allons aborder est celle de la juridiction universelle, de manière à comprendre si
elle conduira à l’unité ou à la fragmentation du droit pénal international.
Sur la base d’un bref aperçu de la littérature sur le sujet, on évaluera le pour et le contre de l’implémentation du principe
de juridiction universelle.  Après quoi, afin de porter notre attention sur l’efficacité et la légitimité du  principe  de
juridiction universelle, défini aussi comme une forme de juridiction controversée, on l’examinera dans les pays qui ont
légiféré différemment en la matière.
Dans la première partie du texte, on donnera un aperçu des Etats qui, par respect pour la ratification du Statut de Rome,
ont résolu le problème de l’universalité de la juridiction en droit pénal selon différentes formes et modalités.
Dans la deuxième partie, à travers quelques cas de jurisprudence, on essayera de répondre à la question suivante : les
Etats, dans l’implémentation de leur propre législation et, par conséquent, leur tribunaux nationaux, utilisent-ils les
mêmes définitions de crime employées par la Cour Pénale Internationale ? Ou, au contraire, adaptent-ils ces définitions
aux circonstances nationales ?
Pour conclure, l’auteur développera des considerations sur l’utilité de la juridiction universelle d’un point de vue de
mondialisation sociologique.
Abstract
This paper represents the outcome of research fellowship Marie Curie at the Universiteit Leiden -Campud Den Haag
Grotius, Centre for International Legal Studies (prof. C. Stahn and prof. Larissa van den Herik, supervisors) on the topic
"The Fragmentation and the Diversification of International Criminal Law in a Global Society”.
In my paper I will examine the question of whether Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) leads to unity or fragmentation within
International Criminal Law (ICL). Given that there is already quite a lot of literature on UJ, it is important to focus the
research on the issue of fragmentation and/or unity rather than to deal with the issue of UJ more generally. I will focus
on this topic in sections 1 and 2, explaining some cursory remarks to these issues in my analysis on fragmentation.
 In the introduction, I will briefly introduce UJ as a controversial form of jurisdiction, but still necessary given that
territorial jurisdiction does not always function well in the case of international crime. I will demonstrate that many
state parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute have vested or reconfirmed UJ for the core crimes when
implementing the ICC Statute. The leading question of my research is whether this practice has led or has the potential
                                                          
1 Il presente articolo è il risultato di un momento di intensa ricerca svolto per il top research course Marie Curie presso
l'Universiteit Leiden -Campud Den Haag Grotius, Centre for International Legal Studies sotto la supervisione dei prof.
C. Stahn e Larissa van den Herik) in tema di "The Fragmentation and the Diversification of International Criminal Law
in a Global Society”.
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to lead to unity or rather to fragmentation within ICL. In the research I will approach this question from different
perspectives.
In section 1 I will examine how State parties have may actually enacted universal jurisdiction for the core crimes, with a
view to determining whether there is indeed some unity on this front or whether the practice on this matter is actually
rather diverse (or fragmented). Subsequently, I will analyse which conditions States have formulated for the exercise of
UJ, and whether this practice is consistent (unity) or again rather diverse (fragmentation). It might also be interesting to
see whether States have different conditions for UJ over core crimes than over other international or transnational
crimes, which would be a sign of real fragmentation between modern ICL (the core crimes) and transnational ICL
(crimes such as terrorism, piracy, money counterfeiting, etc.).
In section 2, on the basis of a few selected case studies, I will ask whether the exercise of UJ has the tendency to lead to
fragmented jurisprudence on substantive ICL. I will try to answer: Do States in their implementation of legislation and
subsequently the national courts use the same crime definitions as the ICC, or are they generally different and tailored
to domestic circumstances? And those questions arise even more strongly for modes of liability? If the latter is the case,
to what extent is the jurisprudence fragmented – is it on minor points, or do we see great divergences in case law on
crime definitions?
Finally,  I  will  make  some  final  observations  on  the  utility  of  UJ  and  whether  in  general  it  will  lead  to  further
fragmentation within ICL, with my personal interpretation of ideal UJ.
1.  Introduction.  The  historical  foundations
and  the  philosophical  underpinnings  of
Universal Juridiction (UJ). Can and should the
UJ  be  exercised  for  the  prosecution  of
individuals  responsible  for  gross  and  serious
violations of human rights?
The general concept of jurisdiction means a legal
authority that enables the States to apply the penal
law, in the area in which this power can be used.
This  area  is  represented  by  the  territory  of  the
States.  Criminal  jurisdiction  is  in  fact  a
prerogative of sovereign States, giving them the
power  to  judge  the  offences  committed  within
their conventional borders.
Under  this  approach,  States  are  authorized  to
exercise their jurisdiction, according to permissive
principles such as territoriality, active and passive
personality,  protective  and,  finally,  universality
principles.  In  the  case  of  universal  jurisdiction
what has become of the nexus between the case
and the state? According to universal jurisdiction,
there is nothing to connect the  criminal factors,
linking  to  the  state’s  interests.  Universal
jurisdiction is based solely on  the nature of the
crime”  without  regard  to  where  the  crime  was
committed,  the  nationality  of  the  alleged  or
convicted  perpetrator,  the  nationality  of  the
victim,  or  any  another  connection  to  the  State,
exercising such jurisdiction”
1.
What  are  the  historical  grounds  for  this
jurisdiction?  What  is  its  logical  basis?  And,
finally,  can  and should  universal jurisdiction  be
exercised?  First  of  all,  tracing  universal
jurisdiction back to its real origins, the minority
authoritative doctrine, with which I agree, locates
the source of this principle in a few passages of
the  Old  Testament
2.  Here,  in  some  books,  it  is
written that God does not only indict and punish
the  Jewish  people,  the  inhabitants  of  the  place
called Israel, but also foreign people and foreign
States, such as Damascus, Gaza, and Edon, once
they have committed delicts offensive to all the
                                                          
1 The definition is due to the first Princeton principle
on  universal  jurisdiction,  in  Bassiouni  M.  C.  et  al.,
“The Princeton Principles  on  Universal  Jurisdiction”,
in  M.  C.  Bassiouni  (edited  by)  (Eds),  Post-  conflict
Justice, Transnational Publishers, N.Y., 2002, at 1003.
See  recently  on  topic  Orakhelashvli  A.,  “Between
Impunity and Accountability for Serious International
Crimes: Legal and Policy Approaches”, in Netherlands
International Law Review, LV(2008), 207.
2  See Höffe O., Gibt es ein interkulturelles Strafrecht?
Ein  philosophischer  Versuch,  Suhrkamp  Verlaine,
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mankind
3. Of course, this is a theoretical approach
which  is  not  a  legal  source  that  can  support
research into universal patterns of criminal law
4.
In  as  much  as  the  minority  doctrine  lacks  any
legal source, we are lead to analyze the majority
doctrine,  which  traces  the  origin  of  universal
jurisdiction back to a passage of the sixth century
Codex Iustiniani
5. By regulating the competence
of the different governors of the Roman Empire,
the  Code  conferred  jurisdiction  on  both  the
tribunal  of  the  place  where  the  crime  was
committed (forum commissi delicti, the territorial
jurisdiction) and the place where the perpetrator
was  arrested  (forum  deprehensionis).  This  was
indeed a typical form of universality rooted in the
Roman conception of the Empire
6: all crimes that
take  place  in  Roman  territory,  comprised  of
different countries, are subject to Roman criminal
law.  Considering Rome to be a global state, the
Roman  tribunals  regarded  themselves  as
competent  to  judge  all  criminal  matters  that
occurred anywhere within the Roman Empire.
During  the  mediaeval  age,  according  to  the
Statutes  of  the  Northern  Italian  States,  which
followed  the  Roman  conception  of  jurisdiction,
offenders  could  be  prosecuted  anywhere  they
were  found.  The  general  rule  was  everybody’s
rule.  It  is  clear  that  the  rationale  for  universal
jurisdiction was not uniformly understood during
this period. Thereafter, in the modern age, Hugo
Grotius theorized universal jurisdiction, applying
                                                          
3 See Amos, I: 3; 2:8; Isaiah 13-23; Jeremiah, 46-51,
Ezekiel, 25-32; Jonas 1.1.
4 See for cursory and legal justifications of universal
jurisdiction C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International
Law, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 2008, at 106.
5  Codex  Iustinianus,  recensuit  Paulus  Krueger,
Berolini, Weidmanno, 1877, at 252.
6  T.  Mommsen,  Le  droit  pénal  romain,    Albert
Fontemoing éditeur, Paris, 1907, at 121.
it to crimes violating natural law and upsetting the
societas generi humanis
7.
The universality principle for the first  time  laid
the basis for exceeding territorial boundaries. The
classical crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction
without boundaries under customary international
law is piracy
8.  Pirates are men without kingdom,
law,  or  historical  past;  sometimes  considered
stateless,  they  lived  sailing  on  the  high  seas
outside the state’s sovereignty. This is the political
justification  giving  to  all  States  jurisdiction  to
punish  piracy  offenders
9.  As  an  act  of  juridical
transliteration,  the  transnational  dimension  of
crimes such as piracy that concern the common
interests of multiple states, is transformed into the
international dimension  of  a  crime  affecting  the
interests  of  all  States.  Transnational  crimes  are
fundamentally different from international crimes.
A  transnational  crime,  such  as  terrorism  or
counterfeiting,  concerns a  state’s  competence  to
exercise  jurisdiction  where  state  sovereignty  is
absent or is common to multiple states, whereas
international  crimes  such  as  genocide  affect  the
universal values of the global community
10. The
universal right to prosecute the crime wherever it
was committed came into being for this reason,
allowing every State to become the venue of an
(in)ternational trial.
                                                          
7 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Libri tres, euravit
B.J.A. De Kanter-Van Hettingatromps, Scientia Verlag
Aalen, 1993, at 509.
8    C.  Schmitt,  Il  nomos  della  terra:  nel  diritto
internazionale  dello  «jus  publicum  europaeum»,
Adelphi, Milano, 1991, at 207.
9  About the historical and philosophical implications
see C. Schmitt, Terra e Mare, Giuffrè editore, Milano,
1986,  50-51.  Recently  Shy  Kraytman  Y.,  “Universal
Jurisdiction-Historical  Roots  and  Modern
Implications”,  in  Journal  of  International  Studies,
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2. Researching legal frameworks: will universal
jurisdiction  advance  the  unity  or  the
fragmentation of international criminal law?
The topic of universal jurisdiction is controversial,
but  nevertheless  not  uninteresting,  from  two
different  aspects  of  international  law:  first,  the
question  of  the  legality  of  the  principle  and  its
recognition by states, and second, the question of
how  universal  jurisdiction  is  exercised.  The
principle reason for this controversy is the lack of
sources and positive law defining the limits and
conditions  of  universal  jurisdiction.  One
commentator, Antonio Cassese, has asserted that
there is nothing about customary international law
which  authorizes  states  “to  assert  criminal
jurisdiction  over  offences  perpetrated  abroad  by
foreigners  against  foreigners”
11.  Some  theorists
have deemed universal jurisdiction to be a form of
national jurisdiction in the national territory, when
a state with no other nexus to the crime exercises
jurisdiction where a suspect is present. That is to
be  distinguished  from  international  criminal
jurisdiction exercised by international courts and
tribunals
12.
Universal  jurisdiction  also  applies  when  a  state
fails  to  exercise  territorial  jurisdiction,  either
because  it  could  not  or  would  not.  Each  case
implies the presence of international crimes.  As
William Schabas has commented, “it is the sheer
scale and horror of the crime concerned, such as
                                                                                         
10  See  Schabas  W.,  “Regions,  Regionalism  and
International Criminal Law”, in New Zeeland Yearbook
of International Law, 4(2007), at 3.
11 See Cassese A., “Is the Bell tolling for Universality’
A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction,
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 1(2003), at
589.
12  Inazumi  M.,  Universal  Jurisdiction  in  Modern
International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction
for  prosecuting  Serious  Crimes  under  International
Law, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Oxford, 2005, at 48.
genocide  and  crimes  against  Humanity  that
warrants  universality”
13.  The  inability,  the
impossibility  or  the  unwillingness  of  a  state
genuinely  to  prosecute  or  to  investigate  an
international offence wherever it is committed or
in the time in which it is realized, is expressed in
an important article of the Rome Statute.
 In accordance with the well known principle of
complementarily, embodied in the Preamble and
in  articles  1,  17  of  the  Rome  Statute,  the
International Criminal Court (ICC) can be seen as
the  secondary  means  in  the  prosecution  of
perpetrators of international crimes. In the subtle
balance of international justice, domestic tribunals
have priority over the ICC.  As it is known, ICC’s
competence  is  limited  by  ratione  temporis.  The
permanent tribunal may not take jurisdiction over
crimes  committed  before  July  2002.  For  this
reason,  universal  jurisdiction  continues  to  be
salient.
Nevertheless  the  relationship  between  the  two
different typologies of jurisdiction is complex and
overlapping.  While  the  Rome  Statute  sanctions
and legally defines the categories of most relevant
international  crimes
14,  many  states  parties  have
completely  changed  their  legislation.  Some
provide  for  universal  jurisdiction  in  respect  to
international crimes, and have introduced juridical
definitions of these crimes in their criminal codes.
This returns us to the starting point of this study:
has universal jurisdiction the potential to unify or
fragment international criminal law?
15
                                                          
13 Schabas, op.cit., at 4.
14  As the artt. 6,7,8, ICC
15  On  fragmentation  generally  see  Worster  W.  T.,
“Competition  and  Comity  in  the  Fragmentation  of
International  Law”,  in  Brooklyn  Journal  of
International Law, 34(2008), at 119; Hafner G., “Pros
and Cons ensuing from Fragmentation of International
Law”,  in  Michigan  Journal  of  International  Law,Rivista di Criminologia, Vittimologia e Sicurezza – Vol. V –N. 1 –Gennaio-Aprile 2011 38
3. A legal approach to unity: is there a plea for
a uniform enacting of universal jurisdiction?
First of all, on finding a minimum form of unity, I
will examine some states that have included the
principle of universal jurisdiction in their criminal
systems  before  and  after  the  ICC  Statute  came
into force. In the following section, I will inquire
which crimes reflect global values justifying the
use of universal jurisdiction.
Without unity of law, there is neither uniformity
in  the  application  of  law  nor  predictability  of
judicial decisions. Within a national context, it is
possible to frame the complex system of laws and
jurisdictions; in the international system the unity
is  more  difficult  to  achieve.  Because  there  are
many  different  sources  of  international  law,  for
example customary law, international treaties and
conventions,  jus  cogens,  obligatio  et  omnes,
positive law, it is difficult to achieve a coherent
system  of  laws.  Are  there  any  guidelines  for
locating a certain degree of unity in the analysis
and  application  of  universal  jurisdiction  in  this
world  of  diversity?  In  this  paper,  I  focus  on
identifying  a  sense  of  unity  in  universal
jurisdiction. I furthermore consider the crimes to
which  universal  jurisdiction  can  be  applied  and
the common basis for its application.
In practice, it is not a simple task to incorporate
universal  jurisdiction  by  harmonizing  domestic
definitions of crime. States will have to make their
internal laws compatible not only with the Rome
Statute,  but  also  with  their  domestic  penal
                                                                                         
25(2004),  pp.  849  ss.;  Brownlie  I.,  Problems
concerning  the  Unity  of  International  Law  in
International  Law  at  the  Time  of  its  Codification.
Studies  in  Honour  of  Robert  Ago,  Giuffré,  Milano,
1987, 153, 162; at least Martineau A. C., “The Rhetoric
of  Fragmentation:  Fear  and  Faith  in  International
Law”,  in  Leiden  Journal  of  International  Law,
(22)2009, at 1.
systems.  Different  States  have  taken  different
approaches. In relation to the universal nature of
the crime and the claim of universal jurisdiction,
one  authority,  George  Fletcher,  has  offered  the
following  schemata: 
16a  universal  approach
focuses on the nature of the crime based on the
character  of  the  wrong,  not  the  national
personality  of  the  victim  or  perpetrator.  On  the
other hand a parochial approach is based on the
nationality  of  the  victim  or  criminal,  as  with
treason  or  spying,  or  on  the  territorial  link.
Fletcher’s theory leads to the conclusion that there
are two forms of jurisdiction: the first is based on
the  universality  principle,  while  the  second  is
based on the territoriality or nationality principle.
On  this  view,  the  undisputed  requisite  for
exercising jurisdiction over crimes concerning the
international  community  as  a  whole  is  a
legislative  provision  enacted  before  the
commission of the offence.  This is expressed in
the  principle  nullum  crimem  sine  lege,  the
principle  which  satisfies  at  the  same  time  the
supporters  of  universal  jurisdiction  and  the
skeptics on the topic.  ”Which law to apply?”
17
In this context the aim at achieving unity in the
interpretation  and  application  of  international
criminal law on a global level implies a universal
code of international crimes, or at least an effort to
hypothesize  if  there  is  a  form  of  unity  ratione
materia for applying universal jurisdiction.
                                                          
16 Fletcher G. P., “Parochial versus Universal Criminal
Law”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime  Justice,
3(2005), at 24.
17  See  on  the  maximum  nullum  crimen  sine  loge
Fletcher,  ibidem,  at  21;  the  quotation  refers  to
Koskenniemi  M.,  “The  Fate  of  Public  International
Law:  Constitutional  Utopia  or  Fragmentation?”,
Chorley lecture 2006, London School of Economics, 7
June 2006. «This, again, will depend on how a matter
will  be  described,  which  of  its  aspects  are  seen  as
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This judicial unity would emerge from the crimes
“of concern to the international community as a
whole.” As observed above, universal jurisdiction
focuses on the nature of the crimes. But is there
unity  in  this  field?  Starting  by  general  rules  a
basic  form  of  unity  is  required  to  ascertain  the
presence  of  national  or  international  laws  that
reflect universal jurisdiction.
18 Moving to specific
rules, one must consider the universal crimes.
Legal scholars have identified a permissive and a
mandatory  form  of  universal  jurisdiction.
Permissive  universal  jurisdiction  occurs  when  a
State has an option to use universal jurisdiction
for  a  violation  of  customary  international  law
without any obligation to enact legislation on the
matter.  Mandatory  universal  jurisdiction  occurs
when a State must exercise universal jurisdiction
under  its  conventional  international  law  by
conforming its criminal system to an international
treaty or convention that it has ratified
19. Here I
inquire  into  the  mandatory  form  of  universal
jurisdiction. I explore the laws of those countries
that  have  enacted  universal  jurisdiction  or
modified  it  after  the  Rome  Statute  came  into
force.
3.1 States that have enacted a form of universal
jurisdiction for the core crimes.
Before  ratification  of  the  Rome  Statute  certain
                                                          
18  For  a  complete  overview  of  countries  that  have
enacted  universal  jurisdiction  Reydams  L.,  Universal
Jurisdiction.  International  and  Municipal  Legal
Perspectives, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 2003, 86
ss. For a synthetic global survey see Sabaudo S.P.R.,
“Universal Jurisdiction over CPP-NPA Action against
Rejectionists:  Barangay  San  Vincent  in  Focus,  in
Philippine Law Journal, 2006, pp. 500-501, sub 35 ss.
19  Hale  C.  K.,  “Does  the  Evolution  of  International
Criminal Law end with the ICC? The ‘roaming ICC’: a
Model International Criminal Court for a State-centric
World  of  International  Law”,  in  Denver  Journal  of
International Law and Policy, 35(2007), at 420.
states  included  in  their  criminal  system  an
extraterritorial  principle  that  differed  from  the
principle of universal jurisdiction in its absolute or
conditional form
20.
Article  64  of  the  Austrian  penal  code,  for
example,  addresses  extraterritorial  jurisdiction,
extending  to  specific  listed  offences  or  ”other
punishable criminal acts which Austria is under an
obligation to  punish  even  when  they  have  been
committed  abroad”  including  those  crimes
prohibited by the UN Convention Against Torture
and the Geneva Conventions
21. The provision of
genocide is present in the penal criminal code ex
art. 321, but not war crimes although Austria is a
party to the Geneva Conventions.
Similarly,  Danish  law  permits  the  criminal
prosecution  of  international  crimes  committed
abroad.  This  jurisdiction  is  established  for  the
offences included in the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional protocols I, II. Article 8.6 of the
Danish  penal  code  establishes  jurisdiction  over
genocide, crimes against humanity and violations
of  the  Hague  Conventions.    But  Danish  law  is
subordinate when another State has requested the
extradition of the author of the crimes, or when
the extradition has been refused and the alleged
offences  are  sanctioned  by  Danish  law.  In  the
Danish criminal code it is possible to prosecute
common  crimes  such  as  injury  to  the  person,
outside the territorial limits of Denmark, with a
maximum sentence of eight years imprisonment.
According  to  Article  7  of  the  Italian  criminal
code, Italian judges may prosecute foreigners or
                                                          
20  Reydams  L.,  Universal  Jurisdiction.  International
and Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University
Press,  N.Y.,  2003,  86  ss.  The  States  are  Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Netherlands,  Israel,  Senegal,  Spain,  Switzerland,
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Italian nationals for offences committed abroad in
relation  to  specific  laws  and  international
conventions,  like  the  Geneva  Conventions,  the
UN  Convention  against  Torture,  or  the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of
the  crime  of  Genocide.  This  can  be  seen  as  an
exercise  of  the  universality  principle.  There  is,
however,  no  specific  provision  regarding
universal jurisdiction
22.
Article  689  of  the  French  code  of  criminal
procedure  provides  for  universal  jurisdiction
before French courts for offences such as torture
and terrorism,” committed outside the territory of
the  Republic,”  when  French  law  is  applicable
under  the  provisions  of  Book  I  of  the  criminal
code  or  of  any  statute,  or  of  an  international
convention, against the accused person regardless
of their nationality if they are present in France.
This does not constitute a pure form of universal
jurisdiction, but is rather only a conditional form.
The  French  law  for  extraterritorial  jurisdiction
does  not  apply  to  the  Geneva  Conventions,
although France is a party
23.
In Israeli Law on the prevention and punishment
of  genocide
24,  article  5  provides  that  “a  person
who has committed outside Israel an act which is
an offence under this Law may be prosecuted and
                                                                                         
21  See art. 64.6 Austrian penal code.
22  See  Roscini  M.,  “Great  Expectations.  The
Implementation  of  the  Rome  Statute  in  Italy”,  in
Journal  of  International  Crime  Justice,  5(2007),  pp.
493-511.  On  19th  June  2002  a  draft  law  has  been
presented  in  Italy  for  the  implementing  of  universal
jurisdiction  for  the  international  crimes  (the  criminal
acts  listed in the ratified international conventions  are
the  crime  of  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity  and
war crimes, as well as described in the ICC Statute). The
draft law did not come into force.
23 Sulzer J., “Implementing the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction  in  France”,  in  W.  Kaleck  et  al.  (eds.),
International  Prosecution  of  Human  Rights  Crimes,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 125 ss.
24  The law n. 5710-1950.
punished in Israel as if he had committed the act
in Israel”
25.
In Switzerland, article 6 bis of its criminal code
provides for the principle of universal jurisdiction
for  crimes  committed  abroad  that  violate
international  treaties,  domestic  law,  when  the
perpetrator is in the territory and when there has
been  no  request  for  extradition  or  when  it  has
been  denied.  The  Military  penal  code  contains
articles 108, 109 that penalize offenses committed
in non-international as well as international armed
conflicts,  referring  to  international  humanitarian
law.
Although  the  United  States  has  not  enacted
universal  jurisdiction,  the  Restatement  Third  of
the  Foreign  Relations  Law  of  the  United  States
(1987)  includes  two  provisions  on  universal
jurisdiction: the first § 404 Universal jurisdiction
to define and punish certain offences, recognized
by  the  community  of  nations  as  of  universal
concern, (such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking  of  aircraft,  genocide,  war  crimes,  and
some  acts  of  terrorism);  the  second  §  423
Jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  in  enforcement  of
universal and other non-territorial crimes, a form
of universal jurisdiction, established as a matter of
treaty  obligations  thought  the  inclusion  of  the
principle  aut  dedere  aut  judicare  in  the  treaties
                                                          
25  See  Bass  G.  J.,  “The  Adolf  Eichmann  Case:
Universal  and  National  Jurisdiction”,  in  S.  Macedo
(edited  by),  Universal  Jurisdiction:  National  Courts
and  the  Prosecution  of  Serious  Crimes  under
International  Law,  University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,
Philadelphia,  2003.  «Israel  law  in  1961  included  a
number of principles of universal jurisdiction. Some of
these extraterritorial principles were not Zionist at all,
inherited  from  legislation  under  the  old  British
mandate:  a  standard  1936  provision  for  prosecuting
international pirates as hostis humni generis and a 1936
law against dangerous drugs that evidently did not limit
itself to the borders of Britain’ Palestine mandate» at
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addressing  international  crimes.  Furthermore,
there is a statute that  authorizes  the  exercise  of
universal  jurisdiction,  over  torture  committed
abroad
26.  In  October  2008  the  United  States
recognized  the  universal  jurisdiction  over  child
soldier  cases,  by  enacting  a  statute  empowering
the American courts to prosecute anyone from any
state  for  their  role  in  the  recruitment  of  child
soldiers anywhere in the world
27.
3.2 States that have re-drafted a form of universal
jurisdiction for the core crimes.
The number of states that have enacted universal
jurisdiction has increased after the Rome Statute
came into force, with different consequences. The
implementation by the states parties of the Rome
Statute has, in fact, accelerated the evolution of
universal  jurisdiction.  Even  if  States  parties  are
not compelled by ICC Statute to adopt UJ for the
crimes, several countries have chosen to enact or
to amend universal jurisdiction in their domestic
systems  in  order  to  prosecute  the  authors  of
crimes  under  the  Rome  Statute  on  the  basis  of
universal jurisdiction
28.
The  principle  of  universal  jurisdiction  under
Belgian  law,  as  established  by  an  enactment  in
1993, is expressed in very broad terms.  There is
no  requirement  for  any  nexus  between  Belgium
and the commission of crime, and it covers war
crimes  committed  during  the  course  of
international  armed  conflicts  as  well  as  internal
conflicts, and, as well, crimes against humanity.
This has been characterized as absolute universal
                                                          
26  The  Torture  Convention.  See  18  U.S.C.  §  234a
(1984).
27 See S. 2135 Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 3
October 2008.
28 The articles 6, 7, 8 Rome Statute.
jurisdiction
29. When the ICC was established, the
Belgian  Parliament  passed  the  2003  Act,
reaffirming the principle of universal jurisdiction
and expanding it to cover the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC and
other municipal jurisdictions. In relation to ICC’s
jurisdiction  the  Belgian  Parliament  has  reversed
the rule of complementary; for acts falling under
the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICC,  when  the  ICC
prosecutor  commences  an  investigation,  the
Belgian Court of Cassation is obliged to declare
that its courts lack jurisdiction
30.
Germany  has  also  adopted  a  pure  form  of
universal  jurisdiction.  The  German  code,  has
established  the  principle  of  universality  for  all
criminal offences against international law present
in  the  code  of  international  crimes  even  if  the
crime  was  committed  abroad  and  bears  no
relationship to Germany.
31 In particular, to avoid
impunity for serious human rights violations, the
German code relies, first of all, on the territorial
states; second, on the ICC and, if applicable, other
on  international  tribunals;  and  finally,  on  the
states  acting  in  accordance  with  universal
jurisdiction
32.
                                                          
29  Reydams  L.,  “Prosecuting  Crimes  under
International  Law  on  the  Basis  of  Universal
Jurisdiction:  the  Experience  of  Belgium”,  in  H.
Fischer, C. Kreiβ, S. Rolf Lüder (eds.), International
and  National  Prosecution  of  Crimes  under
International  Law.  Current  Developments,  BWV,
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, II, 2006, p. 799.
30  Vandermeersch  D.,  “The  ICC  Statute  and  the
Belgian  Law”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime
Justice, 2(2004), pp. 133-144.
31 See Section I CCML.
32 So we have a pure form of UJ for the object, the
serious violations of human rights; but a «conditional
subsidiarity  of  the  universal  jurisdiction  principle»,
subordinated  by  a  prosecutor’s  discretion  ex  §153f
CPC.  See  Ambos  K.,  “International  Core  Crimes,
Universal  Jurisdiction  and  §153f  of  the  German
Criminal  Procedure  Code:  A  Commentary  on  the
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The  Netherlands  has  also  embraced  universal
jurisdiction. When the Dutch Government ratified
the ICC Statute, it took into account the decision
of the International Court of Justice in Congo v.
Belgium
33.  Accordingly,  with  respect  to  the  ICJ
issues
34,  the  Dutch  legal  order  has  opted  for  a
regime of conditional universal jurisdiction.  The
Dutch  Ratification  Act,  in  consideration  of  the
relevant provisions of the penal code and the code
of military law, requires either the presence of the
suspect in the Netherlands, or that the crime has
been  committed  against  a  Dutch  national.
Moreover, for universal jurisdiction a nexus must
be shown between the crime and the prosecuting
State.  The presence of the suspect in the domestic
territory constitutes such a nexus. This provision
follows the guidance of the dissenting opinion in
the Yerodia case, to wit, there is no authority in
international  criminal law  for  states  to  establish
universal jurisdiction in absentia
35.
Under Spanish criminal law, Article 23.4 of the
                                                                                         
Stuttgart  Higher  Regional  Courts  in  the  Abu
Ghraib/Rumsfeld Case”, in Criminal Law Forum, 18,
2007, at 43.
33 See Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000  (Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  v.  Belgium),
Judgment, ICJ, 14 February 2002, Website:
www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/Icobe/icobejudgement/icobejud
gement_20020214_giullaume.pdf.
See for a discussion Bottini G., “Universal Jurisdiction
after the Creation of International Criminal Court”, in
International  Law  and  Politics,  36(2004),  p.  503;
Cassese A., “When May Senior State Officials be Tried
for  International  Crimes?  Some  Comments  on  the
Congo  v.  Belgium  Case”,  in  European  Journal  of
International  Law,  13/4,  2002,  at  853;  Wirth  S.,
“Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the
Congo  v.  Belgium  Case”,  in  European  Journal  of
International  Law,  13/4(2002),  at  877;  O’Keefe  R.,
“Universal Jurisdiction-Clarifying the Basic Concept”,
Journal  of  International  Crime  Justice,  2(2004),  at
734.
34  See the dissenting opinions in Yerodia case.
35 See Sluiter G., “Implementation of the ICC Statute in
the  Duch  Legal  Order”,  in  Journal  of  International
Crime Justice, 2(2004), at 159.
Ley  Organica  de  poter  judicial,  the  state  has
jurisdiction  to  proceed  in  respect  to  crimes  and
offences committed in (1) domestic territory; (2)
on  board  of  Spanish  sailing  vessels  or  aircraft,
without affecting laws in international treaties to
which  Spain  is  party;  (3)  committed  abroad  by
Spanish  nationals,  or  foreigners  whose  Spanish
nationality  was  granted  before  the  crime  was
perpetrated.  Under  the  Spanish  regime,  many
crimes  are  included.      The  law  covers  typical
subjects  of  universal  jurisdiction  such  as
genocide,  terrorism,  piracy,  but  it  also  includes
crimes  related  to  female  genital  mutilation  and
many other offenses
36.
In  the  famous  Scilingo  case,  the  Spanish
Audiencia  National  made  clear  the  principle  of
universality,  asserting  that  conditional  universal
jurisdiction  is  based  on  the  presence  of  the
accused in Spain and on the Spanish victims of
Scilingo’s wholesale criminality.
The laws of the United Kingdom provide that the
state may apply vicarious jurisdiction for various
international crimes linked to international treaties
of which the state is a party, e.g. for torture and
grave  breaches  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and
additional Protocol I. Because it is based on treaty
obligations,  the  system  reflects  the  flaws  and
weaknesses of the treaties themselves
37.
There is no provision in the law of England and
Wales for universal jurisdiction, However, section
68  (1-2)  International  Criminal  Court  Act  2001
sets forth that proceedings may be brought against
an  individual  who  commits  a  crime  under  the
                                                          
36  See  above  on  the  difference  between  the  crimes
admitted.
37 Discussion group summary Universal jurisdiction for
international  crimes.  A  Summary  of  the  Chatham
House international group meeting held on 9 October
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Rome Statute outside of the United Kingdom and
subsequently  becomes  a  resident  of  the  United
Kingdom
38.
The Australian International Criminal Court Act
2002  reflects  the  complementary  regime  of  the
Rome Statute with respect to the covered crimes -
offences  of  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity
and  war  crimes.  By  implementing  the  Rome
Statute,  Section  15.4  of  the  Criminal  Code  Act
provides  for  universal  jurisdiction  over  ICC
crimes  committed  in  non-international  armed
conflict  whether  or  not  Australia  has  any
independent treaty obligation with regard to those
crimes
39. Under this Act the mere presence of a
foreigner in  the  national  territory  is  a  sufficient
basis  for  jurisdiction  over  crimes  committed
abroad; residence is not required. The statute does
not  distinguish  between  universal jurisdiction  in
absentia or conditional universal jurisdiction that
requires  the  presence  of  the  perpetrator  in  the
state.
 In  Senegal
40,  the  Code  de  Procedure  pénale
authorizes Senegalese courts to exercise universal
jurisdiction  over  genocide,  crimes  against
humanity and war crimes, not only when a suspect
is located in Senegal, but also when Senegal has
obtained  jurisdiction  by  extradition
41.  Under  the
                                                          
38 See R Cryer R., Bekou O., “International Crimes and
ICC Cooperation in England and Wales”, in Journal of
International Crime Justice, 5(2007), at 440.
39 See Boas G., “An Overview of Implementation by
Australia  of  the  Statute  of  International  Criminal
Court”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime  Justice,
2(2004), at 179.
40 See  article 2 l.n°2007/5 February 2007
41  Senegal. Commentary on implementing legislation
for the Rome Statute, AI Index AFR 49/002/2007. This
is an important breakthrough in view of the decision of
Senegalese Supreme Court, which dismissed the case
against Hissène Habré in 2001, declaring the lack of
jurisdiction  over  foreign  nationals  for  extraterritorial
crimes. See  Cour  de  Cassation  du  Sénégal,  première
chambre statuant en matière pénale, on 20 March 2001,
amended Code provision, it is to expand the list of
crimes  the  courts  may  exercise  universal
jurisdiction over its penal code
42.
In  contrast  to  other  countries,  which  have
extended the jurisdictional powers of the criminal
law outside the national borders, many states, like
Argentina,  have  consistently  maintained  that
criminal law is to be applied exclusively to acts
committed  within  their  territory.  In  such  states,
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is regulated
by  the  principle  of  territoriality,  with  few
exceptions
43.
3.3. The outstanding answer of unity.
As  demonstrated  by  this  selective  survey,  the
forms and conditions for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction are various, and this, of  course  is  a
source of fragmentation in the criminal law. Some
countries, in fact, have adopted an extraterritorial
application of domestic criminal law, also known
as  vicarious  administration  of  justice.    They
extend  their  jurisdiction  to  international  and
national  offences,  by  means  of  active/passive
personality  and  protective  jurisdictional
principles.
In some cases the state exercises its jurisdiction
over  its  nationals,  even  when  they  are  found
                                                                                         
Arrêt  n.14,  Guengueng  et  Autres,  avaible  in:
http//hrw.org/french/themes/habre-cour_de_cass.htlm.
42 See, about the case Hissène Habré and the return to
Senegal  jurisdiction  after  the  implementation  of
legislation giving it jurisdiction over grave violations
of  international  law,  such  as  genocide,  war  crimes,
crimes  against  humanity  and  torture,  Moghadam  T.,
“Revitalizing  Universal  Jurisdiction:  Lesson  from
Hybrid  Tribunals  applied  to  the  Case  of  Hissène
Habré”,  in  Columbia  Human  Rights  Law  Review,
39(2008), at 505-6.
43  See  Gaeta  P.,  “Il  diritto  internazionale  e  la
competenza  giurisdizionale  degli  Stati  per  i  crimini
internazionali”,  in  A.  Cassese,  M.  Chiavario,  G.  De
Francesco (a cura di), Problemi attuali della giustizia
penale internazionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2005, pag.
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outside the territory, or over a perpetrator found
inside the national boundaries, or over one who
becomes a national after committing a crime.  The
status of the victim can also trigger jurisdiction.
For  example,  if  the  victims  are  present  in  the
country  some  states,  such  as  Austria,  Italy  and
Denmark  exercise  jurisdiction  over  crimes
committed  outside  their  territory.  Only  a  few
states,  including  Belgium,  Spain  and  Germany,
have  introduced  the  principle  of  universal
jurisdiction  as  positive  law  for  certain
international  offences.  The  divergence  in
substance and appearance among these legislative
provisions  is  remarkable.  On  first  consideration
one might conclude that codification of universal
jurisdiction  would  advance  uniformity  in  the
interpretation  and  implementation  of  the  law.
However, on further examination it has  become
clear that  codification  has  only  led  to  a  greater
fragmentation of the principle.
Fragmentation  affects  the  principle  of  universal
jurisdiction because there is no single substantive
norm, but only a complex interaction of juridical
and  practical  objects  and  subjects  reflecting  the
existence of multifarious sources of international
criminal  law,  made  up  of  hundreds  of
international treaties as well as customary rules.
As with every legal innovation, the development
of universal jurisdiction is a dynamic process with
latent  contradictions  and  idealistic  aspirations.
Our research about unity in universal jurisdiction
exposes the  challenges  of  seeking  uniformity  in
norms that are in transition.
The Eichmann case provides a useful example of
the  central  problem  in  universal  jurisdiction.
Eichmann argued that the Israeli court could not
exercise  universal jurisdiction over  him  because
there was no support for it in international law.
Specifically,  Article  VI  1948  Genocide
Conventions  provides  that”  [a]  person  charged
with  genocide  shall  be  tried  by  a  competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the
act was committed or by such international penal
tribunals” formed by the contracting Parties that
have  accepted  its  jurisdiction.  The  Jerusalem
district  court  declared  that  ”the  principles
underlying  the  Convention  are  principles  which
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
all  States,  even  without  any  conventional
obligations.”
44  What  then  is  the  principle  that
legitimates  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Israeli  court
over Eichmann? Hannah Arendt, in The Banality
of  Evil,  addresses  this  question
45.  Israel  could
argue that Eichmann was indicted during the first
trial  in  Nuremberg,  but  after  the  arrest  warrant
escaped  to  Argentina.    On  taking  Eichmann
prisoner, Israel captured a hostis humanis generis,
finding  him  guilty  of  crimes  against  humanity.
Genocide is, in fact, an offence against humanity
as  whole,  and  in  this  case,  the  Jewish  people
represent “humanity.” This argument is at once a
moral standard and a declaration of positive law.
The  State  of  Israel’s  “right  to  punish”  derives
from” a universal source (pertaining to the whole
of mankind) which vests the right to prosecute and
punish  the  crimes  of  this  order  in  every  State
within the family of nations”
46.
The  concept  of  universal  jurisdiction,  and  the
                                                          
44 Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  (Advisory
opinion) 1951, ICJ Report, 16.
45 See Arendt H., Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on
the Banality of Evil, Penguin Books, N.Y., 1963, at p.
261.
46  Attorney  General  of  Israel  v.  Eichmann,  36
Int’L.Rep.18, 50 (Ist.Dist.Ct.-Jerusalem 1961, aff.’d 36
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underlying crimes, represents an ethical right that
has  been  transformed  into  a  legal  right  with
juridical status, protected by international criminal
law. The principle of universal jurisdiction must
yet be defined in the positive law, even if many
projects on uniform drafting are in progress.  Here
we search for unity. We will attempt  to  outline
some possible concepts of unity.
 4. The possible concepts of universal offences
in the modern legislations and in the state of
jurisprudence. Is there unity in the application
of  universal  jurisdiction  within  international
criminal law?
4.1.  A  certain  distinction:  transnational  crimes
versus international/universal crimes.
We  will  now  analyze  whether  universal
jurisdiction is properly applied to specific crimes,
namely  to  the  core  crimes  in  the  different
countries  that  are  party  to  the  ICC  Statute.
Secondly, this inquiry about unity  considers  the
definition  of  crimes  both  under  universal
jurisdiction as adopted by the states, and under the
ICC Statute. What is here the affect of jus cogens?
Do  states,  in  their  implementing  legislation,  or
national  courts  in  their  jurisprudence,  use  the
same definitions of crimes as the ICC, or are they
tailored to domestic circumstances and therefore
diverse?
The Appeals Chambers of the ICTY, in the case
of Prosecutor v. Tadic, has opined that “universal
jurisdiction  (is)  nowadays  acknowledged  in  the
case  of  international  crimes”
47.  Following  the
authority  of  Tadic,  the  Trial  Chamber,  in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ruled that every State
has the right to prosecute and punish the authors
of  crimes  that  are  universally  condemned
wherever they occur
48.
These  cases  make  clear  that  a  state  can  apply
universal jurisdiction to international crimes... But
what  are  the  so-called  international  crimes?  Or
even  more  challenging,  what  is  the  primary,
essential typology of an international crime?
In general international law, universal jurisdiction
is provided for in a number of multilateral treaties,
as the 1973 Convention  on  the suppression and
punishment of the crime of Apartheid
49, the 1984
Convention  against  torture  and  other  cruel,
inhuman  treatment  or  punishment
50,  the  1988
Montréal  Convention  on  hijacking
51,  the  1988
Convention on the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts
against the safety of maritime navigations
52, the
1973  Conventions  on  the  prevention  and
punishment  of  crimes  against  internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents
53,
the  1979  Convention  against  the  taking  of
hostages
54, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of
the United Nations and associated personnel
55, the
1971  Convention  on  psychotropic  substances
56,
the 1961 Single Convention on narcotic drugs and
more others
57.
In  sum,  treaty  law  makes  clear  that  universal
jurisdiction  is  applicable  to  numerous  crimes.
However, is genocide similar to drug trafficking?
                                                                                         
47 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I, para. 62.
48 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17-1, para.156, with
referring to Eichmann Case and Demjanijuk Case. «It
is  the  universal  character  of  the  crimes  in  questions
which  vests  in  every  State  the  authority  to  try  and
punish those who participated in their commission».
49 See articles 4,5.
50 See article 5.2
51 See article 3 in relation to article 5.2.
52 See article 3.
53 See article 3.
54 See article 5.
55 See article 10.
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Is  extermination  of  civilian  populations  with
intent to destroy them similar to counterfeit ring?
Are Mafia organized associations like torture or
the  inhuman  treatment  of  persons?  The
application  in  accordance  with  treaty  does  not
seem to turn on the severity of the crime.  The list
of crimes is not explicable in relation to the object
(whether more or less serious or dangerous), but
rather to two different aspects of the nature of the
crime.  These  two  aspects  are  first  of  all,  the
manner in which the crime unfolds across borders,
and second, the universal condemnation of certain
grave offenses. In the first category, transnational
crime turns on the operational capacity of criminal
organisations  across  the  borders  of  many
countries: the crime is reflected in multiple states.
Also known as cross-border crimes, these criminal
acts  are  distinguished  by  their  multiterritorial
dimension,  as,  for  example,  the  traditional
markets  of  organised  crime  -  drugs,  arms  and
lately  the  trafficking  in  human  beings.  (These
people  may  be  refugees  from  war-torn  regions,
immigrants  seeking  employment,  which  they
cannot find in their own country, or women and
children trapped in the web of prostitution).
While  not  my  subject  here,  the  definition  of
transnational crime remains unclear, and this too,
contributes  to  fragmentation
58.  More  often  it  is
described  stereotypically  as  “organized  crimes”
which cross national borders, while international
crimes are those prescribed by international law
and custom. On the other hand, these transnational
offenses are sometimes defined as acts prohibited
                                                                                         
57 See article 36.4.
58  See  Passas  N.,  “Globalization,  Criminogenetic
Asymmetries  and  Economic  Crime”,  in  European
Journal of Law Reform, 1(1999), 399, at 400-01, with
referring  to  Bassiouni,  “The  penal  Characteristic  of
by the penal law of more than one country. Recent
developments, however, have completely altered
these  understandings  of  transnational  offenses.
Individuals  can  now  bring  actions  against  state
actors  and  can  be  prosecuted  for  breaches  of
international criminal laws. In this new context,
the  distinction  between  transnational  and
international  crimes  is  difficult  to  ascertain  and
not particularly helpful. The two expressions are
often used interchangeably, although they apply in
different situations, and, as well, have some points
in common.
Moreover  transnational  crimes  like  international
crimes are not clearly set forth in domestic legal
regimes.  This  leaves  open  the  possibility  of
adopting non –legal criteria for such crimes. As
one commentator notes, “[t]transnational crime is
cross-border misconduct, which entails avoidable
and unnecessary harm to society, which is serious
enough to warrant State intervention and similar
to other kinds of acts criminalized in the countries
concerned or by international law.”
As  for  the  term  “international  crime,”  we  refer
here to offences which damage the global values
of  the  international  community.  This  is  the
fundamental underpinning of international crime.
Indeed,  within  the  meaning  of  the  universal
approach, a formal legal definition of crime is an
act  violating  the  human  right  of  another,
regardless of where the delict has been committed.
The  search  for  unity  of  universal  jurisdiction  is
restricted and limited to a specific field, to wit, the
violation of human rights, safeguarded by norms
that reflect universal values.
                                                                                         
Conventional  International  Law”,  in  Case  Western
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4.2  Global  crimes  that  could  be  subject  to
universal jurisdiction (a selected list).
The two criteria I propose here to determine if a
specific  crime  should  be  subject  to  universal
jurisdiction are whether (1) the act is contained in
the  Rome  Statute;  and  (2)  the  act  violates
universally accepted values.
I  will  consider  here  the  specific  offences  of
genocide,  war  crimes,  and  crimes  against
humanity. These are crimes that offend humanity
as a whole; hence the nature of the crime is the
basic criterion to apply universal jurisdiction. Two
exegetic  directions  can  be  discerned:  the  legal
provisions  in  the  text  of  the  Rome  Statute,  as
interpreted by case law, as long as they respect the
central  rule  nullum  crimen  sine  lege;  or,  more
subtly, the basic ideological principles, which is
the  philosophic  rationale  underlying  universal
jurisdiction. One orientation does not preclude the
other; rather the two are mutually reinforcing.
Prior to the Rome Statute, lacking an authoritative
definition of crimes against humanity spoke to the
fragmentation  of  universal  jurisdiction.  These
crimes were found in Charter of the International
Military  Tribunal  (IMT)  of  Nuremberg
59.  The
IMT, for the first time, juridical codified crimes
against  humanity  in  two  distinct  categories:  1)
murder,  extermination,  enslavement,  and
deportation of civilian populations, whatever their
nationality; 2) persecution for political, racial, or
religious grounds. As Cassese sums it up “[t]hese
atrocities  are  so  abhorrent  that  they  shock  our
sense of human dignity.”
60 As legal meanings for
                                                          
59 See article 6(c).
60  See Cassese A., “Crimes against Humanity”, in A.
Cassese,  P.  Gaeta,  J.H.W.D.  Jones  (eds.),  The  Rome
Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court:  a
Commentary, vol. I, 2002, pp. 353 et ss. «After 1945
the  link  between  crimes  against  humanity  and  war
these  crimes  have  evolved  in  positive  law  and
jurisprudence, it is clear that such offences must
be large-scale or systematic, and there must be a
nexus to state action.  Where states are not fully
responsible for the crimes, it must be established
that they have tolerated them.
 Article 5 of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute departs
from customary international law. It  revives  the
nexus  between  the  crimes  and  national  or
international  conflicts,  but  abandons  the
requirement of widespread or systematic practice.
In the Erdemovic case, crimes against humanity
are  defined  as  “serious  acts  of  violence  which
harm  human  beings  by  striking  what  is  most
essential  to  them:  their  life,  liberty,  physical
welfare,  health,  and  or  dignity.  Crimes  against
humanity  also  transcend  the  individual  because
when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes
under  attack  and  is  negated.  It  is  therefore  the
concept of humanity as victim which essentially
characterizes  crimes  against  humanity.”
61  Here,
the jurisprudence reflects an idealistic concept of
humanity  and  considers  it  to  be  an  objective
element of the crime.  Art. 3 of the International
Criminal  Tribunal  for  Rwanda  (ICTR)  Statute
reflects  another  formulation,  requiring  as  an
element  of  the  crime  systematic  attack  against
civilian  populations  for  political,  racial,  ethnic,
and/or religious reasons. Both the ICTY and the
                                                                                         
(armed conflict) gradually disappeared» for the effect
of «article II(I) (c) of such ‘multinational’ legislation as
Control  Council  Law  n.10,  passed  by  the  four
victorious  Powers  four  months  after  the  London
Agreement  by  national  legislations  (Canadian  and
French penal codes), case law as well as international
treaties.  This  evolution  gradually  led  to  the
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ICTR statutes include three categories of offences
that  were  absent  from  the  Nuremburg  Charter:
torture, imprisonment, and rape.
The  ICC  statute  differs  from  the  other  three.
Article 7 ICC Statute requires a specific mens rea:
the  offenses  must  be  committed”  with  the
knowledge of the attack,” which makes  it  more
difficult to prove the crime. In the absence of an
international  convention  on  crimes  against
humanity,  these  offences  can  nevertheless  be
considered  jus  cogens  in  accordance  with  the
Vienna  Convention  (ex  art.  53  of  Vienna
Convention of the law of treaties)
62.
Under the theory of crimes against humanity, one
can  prosecute  a  broad  range  of  human  rights
abuses where there is a discriminatory attack on
civilian  populations.    Such  a  crime  is  not
generally a criminal act under domestic laws, for
these laws do not require that the crime be part of
a “discriminatory attack on a civilian population.”
For example, no such crime can be found in the
Italian penal code. Most delicts included in Article
7  of  the  Rome  Statute  are  covered  by  national
provisions: for example, murder by art. 575 Italian
penal  code;  rape  and  other  forms  of  sexual
violence by articles 609 bis et seq., the crime of
enslavement ex the art. 600. However, the concept
of  widespread  and  systematic  attack  is  absent
from the domestic laws.
When  in  1999  Belgium  incorporated  the  ICC
Statute into its domestic laws, it defined crimes
against  humanity  (genocide)  in  line  with  the
Rome Statute, making Belgium the first state to
make its laws consistent with the Statute
63.
                                                                                         
61  Prosecutor  v.  Eredemovic,  Sentencing  Judgement,
Case.no-IT-96-22-T§  28,  Trial  Chambers  I,  29
November 1996.
62 See Bassiouni, above, p. 973.
63 See the effect of 2003 amendment.
Neither the Nuremberg Military tribunal, nor the
Tokyo  Military  tribunal,  makes  reference to  the
crime of genocide. Article 2 of the Convention on
the  prevention  and  punishment  of  genocide,
adopted in 1948, and first codified the crime as
follows:
genocide  means  any  of  the  following  acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as  such:  (a)  Killing  members  of  the  group;  (b)
Causing  serious  bodily  or  mental  harm  to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within  the  group;  (e)  Forcibly  transferring
children of the group to another group.
The  United  Nations  had  occasion  to  address
genocide  in  connection  with  the  wars  in  the
Balkans. In its resolution 47/121 of 18 December
1992,  concerning  the  situation  on  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  in  1992,  the  General  Assembly
affirmed  the  ”abhorrent  policy  of  ‘ethnic
cleansing’ as a form of genocide.”. In the ICTY
case of  Prosecutor  v.  Kristic of 1  August  2001
the” intent to destroy” element diverges from the
interpretation of the General Assembly resolution.
The Court found there that “ethnic cleansing” or
the intent to remove a group from a particular area
did not constitute “intent to destroy” and therefore
was  not  genocide.  The  Court  reasoned  that”
customary international law limits the definition
of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or
biological  destruction  of  all  or  part  of  the
group”
64.  The  attack  against  the  cultural  and
                                                          
64  See  Prosecutor  v.  Kristic,  IT-98-33-T,  1  August
2001,  Trial  Chambers,  para.  577-580;  Prosecutor  v.
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sociological  features  of  a  human  group  “would
not  fall  under  the  definition  of  genocide,”  the
Court  held,  reasoning  that  “where  there  is  a
physical or biological destruction there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious
property  and  symbols  of  the  targeted  group  as
well.”  Similar  is  the  ICJ  judgement  of  26
February  2007,  in  the  case  of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  v.  Serbia  and  Montenegro
65.  The
Court reasoned as follows:
Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render
an  area  ’ethnically  homogeneous’,  nor  the
operation  that  may  be  carried  out  to  implement
such  policy,  can  as  such  be  designated  as
genocide: the intent that characterised genocide is
’destroy, in whole or in part’ a particular group.
Article  6  of  the  Genocide  Convention  does  not
establish universal jurisdiction but neither does it
exclude  it  as  a  principle  of  customary
international  law.  In  Spain  at  the  time  Scilingo
was decided, there was no authority to prosecute
crimes against humanity as a domestic crime. In
Scilingo the Spanish court resorts to genocide as a
catchall for these criminal acts, even though the
conduct  did  not  constitute  the  separate  legal
category of “crimes against humanity” at the time
when they were committed.  In this respect, the
decision  violates  the  legality  principle,  relying
upon the principle of  universal jurisdiction as  a
default  jurisdiction  whenever  the  territorial  or
national state fails to act. How should the decision
of the Audiencia Nationale be explained? A broad
interpretation  of  genocide  served  to  compensate
for the absence of the more appropriate category
                                                          
65  See  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v.  Serbia  and
Montenegro,  (Case  concerning  the  application  of  the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime  of  Genocide),  unreported,  ICJ,  26  February
2007.
of  ‘crimes  against  humanity’  in  Scilingo
66
Because  the  Genocide  convention  had  no  fixed
content, the judges deployed it to locate a flexible
and dynamic solution, but in doing so, the Court
violated the principle of legality
67.
The  Geneva  Conventions  and  the  Convention
against Torture place a legally binding obligation
on the ratifying States to exercise jurisdiction over
persons accused of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions  and  of  the  Convention  against
Torture or to extradite them to a country that will
accept the accused. The term “war crimes” is not
present  in  the  Geneva  Conventions;  the
Conventions  cover  “grave  breaches,”  as  serious
violations  of  international  humanitarian  law
during  international  or  non  international  armed
conflict, by including both offences defined under
customary law (ex common article 3) of Geneva
Conventions and the offences set forth in Article
85.5  I  Protocol  -  the  real  war  crimes.  The  first
category of war crimes - represented by serious
violations  of  common  article  3  Geneva
Conventions, and other serious violations of laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts of not
international  character  -  led  the  Dutch  Supreme
Court  to  consider  the  armed  conflict  in
Afghanistan as non-international and to exercise
universal jurisdiction ratione materia
68. The Court
                                                          
66  See  Van  der  Wilt  H.,  “Equal  Standards?  On  the
Dialects  between  National  jurisdictions  and  the
International  Criminal  Court”,  in  International
Criminal Law Review, 8(2008), at 236.
67  On  the  flaws  of  Gratiela  P  de  L  and  others  v.
Scilingo,  Spanish  High  Court,  19  aprile  2005,  see
Tomuschat  C.,  “Issues  of  Universal  Jurisdiction  in
Scilingo  Case”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime
Justice,  3(2005),  1074;  Pinzauti  G.,  “An  Instance  of
Reasonable  Universality”,  in  International  Criminal
Law Review, 8(2008), p. 1092.
68 See Dutch war crimes and torture case concerning
Afghanistan, Hague District Court, 14 October 2005;
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underscored  the  obligation  to  take  measures  to
protect  against  other  violations  set  forth  in
paragraph  3  common  to  articles  49/50/129/146,
establishing  universal  jurisdiction  for  these
crimes
69.
As this survey of international crimes that apply
universal  jurisdiction  establishes,  there  is
apparently no uniformity, whether one considers
the  positive  (evolutive/involutive)  definitions  of
the  most  widely  recognized  crimes,  or  whether
one applies interpretations and concepts found in
the selected cases on universal jurisdiction.  This
appears to reflect more than fragmentation in the
application of universal jurisdiction.
One must also acknowledge trends towards unity.
Positive law on universal jurisdiction - its terms
and  conditions  -  exists  in  some  States,  whose
number  is  increasing  day  by  day.  The  legal
definition  of  international  crimes  found  in  the
Rome Statute provides a foundation for applying
universal  jurisdiction.  The  expanding
jurisprudence  on  the  subject  will  also  have
unifying consequences. This unity is not petrified,
but  rather  subject  to  change,  the  demands  of
harmonization,  and  will  be  adapted  to  various
juridical and political contexts
70.
4.3. An acceptable legal solution.
The  multiplicities  of  offences  in  international
conventions that can trigger universal jurisdiction
                                                                                         
Contra, for the applicability of u.j. to war crimes in an
internal conflict, Case of prosecutor v. Darko L., Dutch
Supreme Court, 11 November 1997.
69  See  Mettraux  G.,  “Dutch  Courts’  Universal
Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua
War  Crimes”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime
Justice, 5(2006), at 366; Zegveld L., “Dutch Case on
Torture committed in Afghanistan. The Relevance of
the  Distinction  between  Internal  and  International
Armed  Conflict”,  in  Journal  of  International  Crime
Justice, 5(2006), 876.
70 Van der Wilt, above, pp. 270-71.
reflect  an  evolving  vision  of  human  rights,  one
often not shared universally
71.
The Rome Statute can provide a partial solution.
The Statute for the first time provides unequivocal
definitions of the terms genocide, crimes against
Humanity and war crimes – terms that therefore
did not exist in domestic regimes, or existed  in
various  and  often  contradictory  forms.  Since
Rome, these offences “take on a life of their own
as  an  authoritative  and  largely  customary
statement  of  international  humanitarian  and
criminal law, and may thus become a model for
national laws to be enforced under the principle of
universal  jurisdiction.”
72  Many  states,  for
example, even after becoming parties of the Rome
Statute,  have  not  included  in  their  domestic
regimes  the  juridical  definitions  of  international
crimes in the Statute. Other states have adopted
formulations  that  in  some  cases  completely
conform  with,  or  in  others,  significantly  differ
from the Statute
73.
The states fall into these categories:
1. The States that have defined the ICC crimes in
their criminal codes or laws in terms identical to
the  ICC  Statute,  e.g.,  the  United  Kingdom,
Australia,  South  Africa.  The  advantage  here  is
that there is at least unity of positive definitions of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
as between the Statute and the domestic regime.
But  of  course,  although  the  text  is  the  same,
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72  Meron  T.,  “Crimes  under  the  Jurisdiction  of  the
International Criminal Court”, in  H.A.M.  von  Hebel,
J.G. Lammers & J. Schukking (eds.), Reflections on the
International  Criminal  Court,  1999,  at  47-8,  181,  at
185-6.
73 See J.B.TERRACINO, National Implementation of
ICC Crimes. Impact on National Jurisdictions and the
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jurisprudence and practice could over time result
in  broader  or  more  restrictive  interpretations  of
the ICC crimes by domestic courts.
2. The States that use broader terms than the ICC
definitions,  e.g.  Bosnia  Herzegovina,  and  the
Netherlands.  In  the  new  criminal  code  of  the
independent  state  deriving  from  the  Former
Yugoslavia,  for  example,  contains  a  broader
interpretation  of  war  crime.    The  unlawful
issuance of money and the forced conversion of
persons  to  another  nationality  or  religion  are
deemed  to  be  a  war  crime.  The  Netherlands
sanctions them as international criminal violations
of the customary laws of war, which exceeds the
definition of war crimes in the Rome Statute. This
broader transliteration of ICC crimes in domestic
regimes, such as the Netherlands, can mean that
some  acts  not  criminalized  by  the  Statute  are
deemed  to  be  criminal  by  the  domestic  regime.
This  exercise  of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  can
impose  risks  of  two  sorts:  it  may  violate  the
legality  principle  and  present  high  sovereignty
costs.
3.  The  States  that  have  adopted  restricted
definitions  of  ICC  crimes,  e.g.  France  and
Equator
74. The French State defines crimes against
humanity under the art. 212-1 of its criminal code,
which  omits  rape,  sexual  crimes,  imprisonment,
and  severe  deprivation  of  physical  liberty.
Similarly  with  genocide,  French  law  employs  a
more  restrictive  definition.    Hence  the  risk  of
fragmentation  is  represented  by  two  related
factors:  (1)  international  crimes  left  out  of
domestic legislation will neither not be prosecuted
at  the  domestic  level;  and  (2)  nor  will  they  be
prosecuted because it is not part of international
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recognized  definition  of  Rome  Statute;  the
possibility to prosecute the wide apart crime as an
ordinary crime, due to the forecast present in the
national laws.
4. The States that have not adopted implementing
legislation for the ICC, e.g., Italy.  This presents
the real risk that it will be impossible to prosecute
a crime in the total absence of legal provisions.
In conclusion, this research into the basic unity of
universal jurisdiction has identified many juridical
systems  that  reflect  different  legal  standards  on
the elements of offences and the general rules for
implementing universal jurisdiction as a national
law  with  international  effects.  Unity  and
diversification of law join together in an iterative
process.
4.4.  A  potential  risk  of  fragmentation  in  the
application of universal jurisdiction: the vicarious
administration of justice.
After all dissertations about the inclined unity in
the study of universal jurisdiction, it is only right
to  devote  some  thoughts  on  vicarious  or
representational  jurisdiction.  As  we  have
observed,  some  legislations  and  some  court
decisions  show  deviant  options  and  diversified
keynotes  about  definitions  regarding  the  core
crimes.  The  same  thing  could  say  in  the
disquisition  on  the  concept  of  universal
jurisdiction as vicarious administration of justice.
Pursuant to this ground of jurisdiction, States can
prosecute an offence as representatives of others
States, even if the criminal conduct is an offence
in  the  territorial  state  and  the  extradition  are
impossible.  The  possibility  to  prosecute  an
offence  doesn’t  depend  by  the  nature  of  crime.
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State, the form State applies its own law, not the
other law. The main difference, in fact, between
universal jurisdiction and vicarious administration
of  justice  lies  in  the  aim  of  the  two  forms  of
jurisdiction:  when  the  States  exercise
representational  jurisdiction,  they  protect  the
interests of the territorial States; on the opposite,
the  States  that  exercise  universal  jurisdiction,
protect the interests of international community or
of humanity as a whole
75.
Another  difference  regards  the  field  and  the
requirement  of  application:  the  vicarious
administrations  of  justice  also  apply  to  lesser
crimes  and  its  exercise  is  subject  to  the  double
criminality  and  the  evidence  of  impossible
extradition
76.
When does this margin of national discretion to
adapt those certain/general rules to the local/legal
tradition change in fragmentation?
It  depends  upon  how  the  domestic  legal  order
cope the processes of internationalization or better
globalization  of  international  criminal  law  and
how the States look at the problems confronted in
terms of unity and coherence of their systems. The
fragmentation in the implementation of universal
jurisdiction  would  be  increased:  a  substantial
fragmentation with reference to the human rights
selected as the crimes that concern the Humanity
as  whole;  a  procedural  fragmentation  with
reference to the different tribunals (national and
international) deputy to judge the core crimes; a
geographical  fragmentation,  related  to  the
relationship between the own national order and
any  other  legal  order,  a  growing  asymmetry
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76 See the Dutch law referring to article 4 a paragraph 1
criminal  code,  article  552  hh  Code  on  Criminal
procedure, article 2 International crimes act 2003.
among democratic governments, states, territories,
nationalities,  sovereignties  and  legitimacy  who
concerns the rule of law. The unity as far as the
different manifestations of jurisdiction also in this
case concerns the dialectics between international
and  national  systems,  the  reasoning  between
legality and power.  The fragmentation in all these
cases  could  have  two  effects:  one  negative,
because  of  the  dispersion  of  legal  order,  that
pitfalls  the  credibility  and  the  authority  of
international  law,  as  far  as  the  substantive
criminal law is concerned (with reference to the
elements  of  crimes  we  have  faced  different
definitions or regimes of applications relating to
the same issue), and one positive, as authoritative
doctrine  affirms,  as  far  as  the  vitality  of
international law, because of the proliferations of
rules,  laws,  decisions  might  strengthen  the
criminal  law  system.  In  front  of  a  plurality  of
solutions we can choose the best plan.
5. Concluding remarks. Universal jurisdiction
in translation.
 As I hope to have made clear herein, it is evident
that the concept of unity in respect to universal
jurisdiction  cannot  be  assessed  with  the  same
measures as one would apply to a domestic civil
law system.
As  a  project,  universal jurisdiction  is  subject to
mediation.    It  reflects  the  transformation  of
universal values into universal law; principles of
normative  behaviour  come  to  acquire  positive
legal  status.  The  primary  tension  affecting  the
global  application  of  universal  jurisdiction  is
represented  by  the  conflict  between  the  moral
claims  of  human  rights  norms  and  the  political
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in  the  fact  that  international  crimes  occur  daily
and take place in every country.
Despite  this  contradiction,  the  idea  of  universal
jurisdiction governing human rights has inspired
the  creation  of  many  laws,  norms,  institutions,
declarations,  and  the  proliferation  of  ideas.  The
principle  has  entered  an  evolutionary  phase”
which  is  characterised  by  a  transition  from
international to cosmopolitan norm of justice”
77.
As  it  evolves,  universal  jurisdiction  could
represent  a  “cosmopolitan”  norm,  a  dynamic
process  through  which  the  principles  of  human
rights  are  progressively  incorporated  into  the
positive laws of democratic States
78. In this paper
we  have  analysed  where  and  how  universal
jurisdiction  has  been  applied,  and  we  have
demonstrated  evidence  of  diversification  of  the
concept from a legal point of view.
A  new  process  of  norm  creation  is  emerging.
Through repeated engagement with human rights
norms  barriers  can  be  removed  and  boundaries
can be redrawn within existing democracies. As
one  commentator  has  noted,  in  the  global
environment  of  universal  jurisdiction,  “the
                                                          
77 See the philosophical approach that refers to Kant’s
theory  on  perpetual  peace,  Benhabib  S.  et  al.,  “The
Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms” in
R. Post (eds.), Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality,
Sovereignty  and  Democratic  Interations,  Oxford
University Press, N.Y., 2006, at 16. Recently following
this  direction  see  Addis  A.,  “Imagining  the
International Community: the Constitutive Dimension
of Universal Jurisdiction”, in Human Rights Quarterly,
31, 2009, at 159.
78 Benhabib S., Ibidem, argues the universalization of
cosmopolitan  norms,  the  dialogue  between  the
universal  and  the  particular,  as  well  as  the
operationalization  and  broader  expansion  of  Kant’s
notion of hospitality in the actions of democratic states
which uphold the norms of cosmopolitan human rights.
In the same direction D.F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?
Reconciling  Universal  Jurisdiction  with  Democratic
Principles,  in  International  Law  and  International
Relations:  Bridging  Theory  and  Practice,  above,  at
207-8.
contradiction between the universalism of ethics
and  the  particularity  of  law  can  never  be  fully
transcended but only progressively ameliorated in
time”
79.
The process of (re)creating universal jurisdiction
and of changing (non)existent laws in the project
of  supporting  human  rights  norms  and  global
justice  requires  constant  (re)negotiation  and
redefinition  between  political  governments  and
organisations  and  juridical  guidelines  and
enactments. The concept of universal jurisdiction
will  naturally  be  segmented  until  it  realises  a
coherent legal status. This could be happen though
an  iterative  democratic  process  –  a  process  of
“linguistic, legal, cultural and political repetitions
in-transformation  which  not  only  change
established  understandings  but  also  transform
what passes as valid”
80. It is in this manner that
progressive  normative  and  legal  change  take
place. Hence, through repeated engagement with
and redefinition of certain norms new mores and
social practices are created. We can advance the
real implementation and application of universal
jurisdiction, moving in the direction of a process
of  jurisgenerative  politics,  which  “includes  the
augmentation of the meaning of rights claims and
the growth of the political authorship by ordinary
individuals”  in  order  ultimately  to  lead  to  a
politics  of  inclusion
81.  Cosmopolitan  principle
must  inevitably  collide  with  the  boundaries
required  by  democratic  authority.    Universal
jurisdiction is neither merely moral nor just legal,
nor is it framed in a global rather than domestic
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80 Benhabib S., Ibidem, at p. 48.
81 Benhabib S., Ibidem, at p. 49. «In this process both
the ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ engage with rights values
and meanings to create new norms and laws that move
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context. Also on stigmatizing the crimes against
humanity in a legal and political context, the State
have  ‘created’  unprecedented  (legislative  and
practicing) act. Now it is only a matter of time.
Governments  will  eventually  recognise,  through
legalisation and juridification, the rights claims of
human  beings  everywhere,  regardless  of  their
membership in bounded communities.
And we, as intended intellectuals, have the duty to
ensure that,  in the absence  of  a  global criminal
system  of  law,  in  the  absence  of  international
democratic global order, that the universal justice
of human rights, while imperfect, fragmented, and
not completely defined, is, perhaps, the one most
readily realised at the moment.
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